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declare the public policy of the state in unmistakable terms and so
28
place such unions in the list of marriages the state will not recognize,
in the absence of this type of legislation, the fundamental desire of the
state to validate a marriage once created,2 4 especially if followed by
cohabitation, 25 will be so strong as to leave no alternative but to give
effect to the marriage.
Louis G. IASILLI.

THE TIME OF FILING CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACTS.-Following the turn of the century, increased industrial production resulted
in widespread installment buying. Nation-wide commercial relationships caused litigation directing attention to the existing disparity of
laws I governing conditional sales contracts.2 In order to settle the
confusion and simplify the law, Professor Bogert 3 compiled a Uniform Conditional Sale Law 4 in 1921. It was adopted with changes
by New York State in 1922 and incorporated into the Personal Property Law, Sections 61-80g.5
= States that have enacted such evasion statutes, known as the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act, are Vermont, Wisconsin, Illinois, Louisiana, West Virginia and Massachusetts. An example of this type of legislation follows:
"Any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is
disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under laws of this state
[who] shall go into another state or country and there contract a marriage
prohibited and declared void by laws of this state, such marriage shall be null
and void for all purposes in this state with the same force and effect as though
such prohibited marriage had been entered into in this state."
'Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 177 N. W. 683 (1920) (For facts,
see note 1, mspra. The desire of the court to validate the marriage was so
strong as to hold the marriage valid even though there was an evasion statute
in force in Wisconsin at the time).
I Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157 (1819) ("The doctrine in favor of
marriage so contracted is founded on principles of policy to prevent the great
inconvenience and cruelty of bastardizing the issue of such marriage and to
avoid the public mischief which result from the loose states in which people so
situated would live.") ; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws (3d ed. 1846) §§ 123b, 124.
'Ensley Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 121 Ala. 94, 25 So. 729 (1898); Lane v.
Roach's Banda Mexicana Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 439, 79 Atl. 365 (1911); Studebaker
Bros. Co. v. Man, 13 Wyo. 358, 80 Pac 151 (1905).
'For definition of conditional sale, see N. Y. PER. PROP. LAW § 61; for
discussion, see WHITNEY, SALES (2d ed. 1934) § 22; WILLIsTON, SALES (2d ed.
1924) § 324.
'Cornell University Law School.
"MARIASH, SAL.S (1930) Appendix C.
'N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 418, § 116 was amended by N. Y. Laws 1900, c. 762,
§ 1, which was repealed as amended by N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 642, §§ 1, 2; see
Whitney, Conditional Vendors and Prior Realty Mortgagees (1938) 13 ST.
JOHN's L. Rzv. 1.
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A filing of the conditional sale agreement was not necessary at
common law to protect the conditional vendor from the possibility of
having the conditional vendee effectively sell the property to an innocent purchaser for value. The bona fide purchaser for value was regarded as relying on possession in the vendee and since that was not
apparent authority to sell nor indicia of ownership, the purchaser acquired no rights as against the conditional vendor who had reserved
title. 6 Section 65 modified the common law rule in that it had provisions for filing the conditional sale contract, and had the effect of
relieving a purchaser who dealt with the conditional vendee from the
hardship of forfeiture, in the event that the conditional vendee had
failed to comply with the conditions precedent to vesting of title in
him from the conditional vendor. 7 Concerning a third party who was
a bona fide purchaser for value or a lien creditor, the title reserved
in the conditional seller was rendered void unless the contract was
filed before or at the time the conditional buyer mortgaged or otherwise disposed of the subject matter of the contract.8 The statutory
enactment of 1922 was consistent with the modern trend of restricting application of the doctrine of caveat emptor in order to protect
the buying public. 9
Chapter 625 of the Laws of 1938 alters Section 65 of the Personal Property Law in relation to the time of filing conditional sales
contracts by adding a provision to it, originally embodied in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Section 5.1° The amendment provi'des,
in substance, that a conditional sale of personal property reserving
title in the seller shall be void as to purchasers and creditors of the
buyer who, without notice of such contract, purchase the goods or
acquire by levy or attachment, a lien thereon, unless such contract or
copy shall be filed within ten days after the making of the conditional
sale. During the ten-day period subsequent to the consummation of
the conditional sale contract, the common law rule as to purchasers
for value is restored since the seller is protected, although there has
been no filing.
Section 73 of the Personal Property Law required the buyer to
give the seller due notice before exrcising his privilege, express or
implied, to sell, mortgage, or pledge the conditionally bought property.
In the event that the conditional buyer neglected to communicate
the proper information, and disposed of the property to a bona fide
'Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314 (1869) ; Austin v. Dye, 46 N. Y. 500
WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 25.
Realty Associates v. Conrad Construction Corp., 185 App. Div. 464, 173
N. Y. Supp. 25 (2d Dept. 1918).
'In re Lake's Laundry, 79 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); In re Tonawanda Brewing Corp., 13 F. Supp. 345 (D. C. N. Y. 1936); N. Y. Title v.
Crossman Properties, Inc., 142 Misc. 274, 253 N. Y. Supp. 533 (1931).
'Otis Elevator Co. v. Rochester Friendly Home, 103 Misc. 76, 169 N. Y.
Supp. 389 (1918); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Raz Delivery, Inc.,
238 App. Div. 277, 264 N. Y. Supp. 412 (4th Dept. 1933).
" MARIASH, 10C. cit. supra note 4.

(1871) ; see
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purchaser immediately after he received possession and before the
vendor had filed, the latter would not be entitled to the property as
against the bona fide purchaser. Such conduct on the part of the vendee gave the seller the right to retake possession of the goods and
deal with them as if there had been a default in payment." However, since the property was no longer in the vendee's possession
but in that of a third person purchaser for value without notice, the
conditional vendor under the former rule normally found himself
with an inadequate remedy, that of suing the conditional vendee in
tort for deceit ' 2 if knowledge of impending bankruptcy and malice
could be proved. The situation is more fully realized when3 it is noted
that common law deceit is a most difficult thing to prove.'
A more striking hardship occurred where the third party was
a trustee in bankruptcy.' 4 Federal law bestows the status of a lien
creditor upon a trustee in bankruptcy as to all property in the custody of the bankrupt. In an important case, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Raz Delivery, Inc.,' 5 the conditional sale contract was
filed two days after the trucks had been delivered to the conditional
buyer. On the intervening day, the conditional vendee became a
bankrupt and his trustee in bankruptcy attached the trucks which
were later reacquired by the conditional vendee as a remote transferee of the trustee. The county court held that there must be read
into the statute " a provision that the title of the conditional vendor
is superior to the rights of the lien creditor without notice, if the conditional sale contract is filed within a reasonable time, even if the
filing postdates the lien creditor's right. On appeal, it was held there
was no warrant in the statute for the interpolation of such a clause.
After the case was decided it became apparent that Section 65 had
created as keen a problem as it had solved. The recent amendment
to it was intended to grant a fair extension of filing time to the conditional vendor. During the ten-day period the equities unquestionably tend to favor him, especially as against a possible trustee in
bankruptcy.
The new clause is a practical measure in that it simplifies filing
and, in cases where all the installments may be paid within ten days,
it eliminates filing expense entirely.
The law gives third parties who anticipate obtaining title to personalty a reason for pursuing suspicions and doubts based on slight
proof or rumor insufficient to amount to actual notice of a conditional
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 73.
= Dwelle-Kaiser Co. v. Aetna Co., 211 App. Div. 369, 207 N. Y. Supp. 287
(4th Dept. 1925) (one who does business intending not to pay is guilty of
deceit).
' Russ Soda Fountain Co. v. Desind, 150 Misc. 568, 268 N. Y. Supp. 452
(1934) ; EDGAR, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1936) § 183.
' BANKR. Act § 47a (2), 11 U. S. C. A. § 75, subd. A-2; In re Master
Knitting Corp., 7 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (interpreting the law).
'238 App. Div. 277, 264 N. Y. Supp. 412 (4th Dept. 1933).
" N. Y. PaRS. PROP. LAW § 65.
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sale contract, whereas under the old rule such lack of confidence could
be ignored safely if no conditional sale contract had been filed.17 The
ten-day clause will operate to make pledgees and mortgagees
more
8
alert to avenues of investigating those with whom they deal.'
The one manifest difficulty raised by the amendment is the confusion it may foster. Formerly, unless a buyer had notice of a reservation of title in one other than the proposed vendor, he could buy
the property without apprehension, if there was no conditional sale
contract on file. 19 Chapter 625 replaces full assurance with uncertainty. Lack of confidence delays business, reduces volume, and was
definitely not among the objectives desired by the legislature. However, these dire predictions may be more theoretical than real since
a large portion of installment bought goods is acquired not for resale but for personal use, and is unlikely to be sold or mortgaged during the first ten days after it has come into the possession of the
conditional vendee. In instances where goods are bought with the
secret purpose of reselling the same, the ten-day period is not an unusually long time to be allowed to elapse between negotiations for a
sale or mortgage and its culmination. At the termination of this
period, a bona fide purchaser may deal with the property in safety if
there is no contract filed concerning it. Moreover, a conditional sale
contract for resale does not come within the scope of Section 65 but
is exclusively provided for in Section 69, wherein the buyer of such
resold goods is protected in any event, unless he has actual notice of
the conditions of the original contract.20 To whatever extent Chapter
625 of the Laws of 1938 restores caveat emptor, it may be deplored
as an unavoidable corollary to essentially useful legislation. There
is a recent tendency on the part of the legislature to provide "free
filing" time in filing statutes as shown by the Uniform Trust Receipt
Act which provides that in some instances, the title of the trust
17Simpson v. Hinson, 88 Ala. 527, 7 So. 264 (1889)
(in the case at bar
information was given of a personal liability on the part of the mortgagor of
property mortgaged to another, but it was held that no rule of law makes
information of such liability constructive notice of a secret unrecorded contract
reserving title to it and, therefore, the mortgagee got superior rights to that of
the conditional vendor who had not filed). Accord: Cashman v. Lewis, 26
Ariz. 95, 22 Pac. 411 (1924).
"In re Young's Cornell Utilities, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 381 (E. D. N. Y.
1937) ; Werner v. Winzer, 109 Kan. 647, 202 Pac. 80 (1921).
"' Warsaw Elevator Co. v. Wm. J. Gucker, Inc., 236 App. Div. 270, 258
N. Y. Supp. 984 (4th Dept. 1932) (a judgment in favor of the conditional
vendor against the mortgagee of premises was reversed on the ground that the
evidence did not establish actual notice to the defendant mortgagee of the
conditional sale).
N. Y. PFas. PROP. LAW § 69 ("Conditional Sale of Goods for Resale:
When goods are delivered under a conditional sale contract and the seller
expressly or impliedly consents that the buyer may resell them prior to performance of the condition, the same shall be valid whether filed or not, except
that the reservation of property shall be void against purchasers from the buyer
in good faith for value and without actual knowledge of the condition of such
contract.").

1938 ]

CURRENT LEGISLATION

receipt holder shall be valid for a period of thirty days after delivery,
without filing.21
MARJORIE MOSS.

NEW YORK ANTI-LYNCHING LEGISLATION.-The Legislature of

the State of New York during its last session joined an ever increasing
list of states making lynching and mob violence crimes sui generis.1
The words "lynching" 2 and "mob violence" have no technical significance as the offenses were unknown to the common law.3 The
authorities unite in interpreting it as the action of a group of persons
in illegally inflicting punishment on a person either convicted or suspected of a crime.4 In the United States lynching and riots are re' N. Y. Pints. PROP. LAW § 58 (this section was added by N. Y. Laws
1934, c. 574).

'N. Y. Laws 1938, c. 397, amending N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1390, 1391, 1392.
Section 1390: "Any assemblage of three or more persons which shall
exercise or attempt to exercise by physical violence and without authority of
law any power of correction or punishment over any person shall constitute a
mob within the meaning of this article."
Section 1391: "Any act or acts of violence committed by a mob on the
body of a person in custody of any peace officer, or suspected of, charged with
or convicted of the commission of any criminal offense, which act or acts iesult
in the death of a person, shall constitute lynching; provided, however, that
lynching shall not be deemed to include violence occurring between members or
groups of law breakers such as are commonly defined as gangsters or racketeers, nor violence occurring during the course of picketing or boycotting
incidental to any labor dispute, and each and every person who is a member of
a mob which commits such an act or acts of violence is guilty of lynching, and
is punishable by imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence, the minimum of
which shall be not less than twenty years and the maximum of which shall be
for the offender's natural life."
Section 1392: "Each and every person composing a mob, which mob shall
commit an assault upon any person in custody of any peace officer" or suspected
of, charged with or convicted of the commission of any criminal offense, not
resulting in the death of such person, is guilty of a felony and is punishable by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years."
2 The word "lynch" derives its origin from a Virginia farmer named
Charles Lynch, born in 1736, who lived in the vicinity of what is now Lynchburg, Virginia. Lynch was a man of considerable importance in his community
and a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses. During the War of
Independence the nearest trial court was some two hundred miles of frequently
impassable and dangerous roads and rather than navigate this route Lynch
prevailed upon his neighbors that they join him in dealing with the suspected
criminals in a summary fashion. Shortly after the Civil War this method of
trial was recalled and has since been in vogue throughout the country; WHITE,
ROPE & FAGGOT (1929) c. V; State v. Lewis, 142 N. C. 626, 55 S. E. 600
(1906); WoRDs & PHRAsas, Vol. V, 4262.
'See State v. Lewis, 142 N. C. 626, 55 S. E. 600, 611 (1906).
'See Kirkland v. Allendale County, 128 S. C. 541, 123 S. E. 648, 650
(1924) ; State v. Aler, 29 W. Va. 549, 20 S. E. 585, 588 (1894) ; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, p. 287; Black's Law Dictionary, p. 742; 38 C. J. 328.

